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Chapter 1
Introduction

The Equity Funding debacle, like all disasters caused by human
actions, offers the promise of useful lessons for the future. Of particu
lar concern to the accounting profession is what may be learned from
this debacle about the adequacy of standards governing the work of
independent auditors.
The dimensions of the Equity Funding disaster and the general
nature of its causes were revealed within a period of a few weeks in the
spring of 1973. In March of that year, press reports questioned the
integrity of the consolidated financial statements and other records and
reports of the apparently successful Equity Funding Corporation of
America (EFCA) and its subsidiaries, including Equity Funding Life
Insurance Company (EFLIC). Within a month, on April 4, the parent
company filed a petition in bankruptcy. It appeared by then that a
fraud of substantial proportion had been carried out over several years
by certain officers and employees of the Equity Funding companies.
The result of the fraud was to present to investors, creditors and regu
lators a picture of ever-increasing earnings and assets and to stimulate
an active market in the securities of the parent corporation. It is now
apparent that much of the reported earnings and assets were false.
EFCA’s publicly held securities, with a previous market value in the
hundreds of millions of dollars, are now virtually worthless.
The Equity Funding collapse brought on a host of legal proceed
ings, many of which are likely to go on for years. In addition to the
bankruptcy proceedings, there have been investigations by insurance
regulatory agencies of several states, as well as by the Securities and
Exchange Commission and other federal agencies, grand jury investi
5

gations which have resulted in the indictment and in some cases convic
tion of corporate officers and employees; the indictment of certain of
the auditors;* disciplinary proceedings by the New York Stock Ex
change; and scores of civil lawsuits.
A number of questions are raised by this disaster. In addition to
criminal culpability and civil liability, the questions involve the suffi
ciency of regulatory procedures affecting publicly owned companies,
including life insurance companies, and the adequacy of prevailing
assumptions about the responsibilities of various kinds of professions
and occupations— including accountants, lawyers, actuaries, investment
bankers and securities analysts— in relation to enterprises like Equity
Funding.
Some of these questions concern standards governing the work of
the public accounting profession, for EFCA had published annual con
solidated financial statements through December 31, 1971 giving a false
and misleading picture of its operations and financial position. These
financial statements had carried reports by independent auditors which
indicated that the financial statements had been examined in accordance
with generally accepted auditing standards and were presented fairly in
conformity with generally accepted accounting principles. The exami
nation of the consolidated financial statements which were to be in
cluded in the 1972 annual report was substantially complete and printer’s
proofs were prepared. However, the consolidated financial statements
and the auditors’ report thereon were never issued.
On May 5, 1973, the Board of Directors of the American Institute
of Certified Public Accountants, recognizing the importance of the
questions raised with respect to the adequacy of prevailing professional
standards, resolved that the president of the Institute should appoint
a special committee to study whether auditing standards applicable to
the examination of financial statements should be changed in the light
of Equity Funding. The Board’s resolution was as follows:
w h e r e a s , the Institute shares the general public concern about the
Equity Funding disaster, which caused enormous losses to investors and
creditors apparently by reason of massive and collusive fraud; and
w h e r e a s , developments in the Equity Funding matter may suggest
that changes in generally accepted auditing standards are called for; and
w h ereas,

id e n t i f i c a t i o n a n d i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f a n y s u c h c h a n g e s in

* On M ay 20, 1975 a federal district court jury returned a verdict o f guilty in a
trial o f three o f the accountants involved with Equity Funding.
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generally accepted auditing standards should not await the eventual
resolution of litigation or other proceedings concerned with assigning
responsibility in respect of Equity Funding.
n o w t h e r e f o r e b e i t r e s o l v e d , that a special committee be ap
pointed by the president of the Institute to study whether the auditing
standards which are currently considered appropriate and sufficient in
the examination of financial statements should be changed in the light of
Equity Funding, and report its conclusions to the Board of Directors
and the auditing standards executive committee.

The appointment of the special committee to consider the possible
larger implications o f Equity Funding should not be understood as in
volving any deviation from the Institute’s customary procedure for
dealing with possible departures from the requirements of the Code of
Professional Ethics. Accordingly, any questions raised by the Equity
Funding matter as to adherence to professional standards by members
of the Institute will be handled by the division of professional ethics.

This is the report of the special committee appointed pursuant to
that resolution.
The Committee’s Charge
As the resolution of the Institute’s Board makes clear, the com
mittee was not charged with attempting to assess fault or legal respon
sibility of the accountants or firms involved. Its charge was to consider
whether the Equity Funding matter suggested a need for changes in
generally accepted auditing standards.
The phrase “generally accepted auditing standards” refers to the
ten standards which were formally adopted by the membership of the
Institute in 1948 and 1949. These standards—three “General Stan
dards,” three “Standards of Field Work,” and four “Standards of Re
porting”— are explained and interpreted in a substantial body of pro
fessional literature of which the most authoritative is a series of
pronouncements of the Institute set forth in its Statements on Auditing
Standards.
The committee has understood its charge to require appraisal not
only of the ten standards, but more particularly of the auditing proce
dures by means of which auditing standards are implemented. The
Institute’s Board of Directors has confirmed this understanding.
There were two aspects of this appraisal— one particular and the
other general. The first focused on the auditing procedures that would
customarily have been applied in the circumstances; the other involved
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consideration of the general question of the auditor’s responsibility to
detect fraud.
The specific questions that the committee sought to answer were
these:
1. What was the nature of the fraud in Equity Funding and how was
it accomplished?
2. Would customary auditing procedures provide a reasonable expec
tation of detecting such a fraud?
3. Are any changes in customary auditing procedures called for in
order to provide such a reasonable expectation?
4. Finally, and more generally, is there a need for change in scope of
an auditor’s responsibility for the detection of fraud, or for clarifi
cation of the auditor’s responsibility, for the benefit of the account
ing profession and the public at large?
The Conduct of the Committee’s Study
To answer these questions, the committee did not consider it
necessary to conduct an audit of the financial statements of any of the
Equity Funding entities. In any event, to perform an audit for the
years in which the fraud occurred would probably have been impractical
if not impossible. The auditors appointed by the bankruptcy court
completed an audit as of the date of bankruptcy. Their audit report
appears in the Report of the Trustee of Equity Funding Corporation
of America dated February 22, 1974.
The committee also did not determine what procedures actually
were followed by the auditors of the Equity Funding entities since deter
mination of fault, if any, was not part of its charge. To fulfill its pur
poses, the committee needed to gather information only with respect to
the nature of the fraud and to relate this information to its under
standing of the auditing procedures that would customarily have been
applied in the examination of the financial statements of the Equity
Funding entities.
The information needed for the study was obtained from the
February 22 and October 31, 1974 reports of the Trustee of Equity
Funding Corporation of America and through interviews with his execu
tive staff, representatives of the auditing firm engaged by the Trustee,
representatives of the California and Illinois Insurance Departments,
the conservator for the life insurance subsidiary (EFLIC) and certain

of his staff, and some of the Equity Funding personnel who had been
retained by the Trustee and the conservator.
The committee’s representatives also looked at some of the
records of the Equity Funding entities for the purpose of understanding
the manner in which certain transactions were recorded on the books of
the companies. Access to these records was granted by the Trustee and
the conservator.
The committee’s conclusions in this report necessarily rest upon the
information in the reports of the Trustee and the information gathered
in interviews and other investigations. If that information subsequently
turns out to be inaccurate, the conclusions could be affected.
The committee generally limited its study to the pertinent Equity
Funding entities for the years 1971 and 1972. Although it appears
that the fraud began as early as 1964, the committee concluded that for
its purposes it would be neither practicable nor necessary to extend its
study to years before 1971 or into 1973, for the committee understands
that the general pattern of the fraud which had appeared in earlier
years or in 1973, could be identified without extending the review
beyond these two years.
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Chapter 2
Overview of Equity Funding

To provide background for the detailed discussion which follows,
it will be useful to describe briefly the Equity Funding operation and
the committee’s understanding of the pattern and magnitude of the
fraud.
Description of the Operation
The initial EFCA operation, which began in 1959 with the com
bination of two small securities and insurance marketing organizations,
was that of an independent sales company which marketed mutual fund
shares, life insurance policies and funded programs combining the two.
During the early period of the company’s history, substantially all of its
income was derived from commissions earned. EFCA’s expenses in
connection with the sales of mutual fund shares and life insurance con
sisted principally of commissions paid to agents, the cost of maintain
ing a marketing organization, the cost of administering funded programs
and interest on borrowed money. In the ensuing years the sale of
funded programs became the most important part of the Equity Fund
ing operation. The acquisition of Equity Funding Life Insurance Com
pany (EFLIC) late in 1967 made it possible for EFCA subsequently to
project a corporate image not simply of a marketing organization but
rather of a life insurance-based conglomerate.
The following paragraphs describe the accounting procedures fol
lowed to record legitimate transactions.
11

As previously noted the most significant part of the operation was
the “Equity Funding Program,” which involved the combined sale of
mutual fund shares and life insurance. Under the “program” an inves
tor would, for example, purchase mutual fund shares for $1,000, pledge
these shares as collateral for a loan of $400, and use the $400 to pay
the first annual premium on a life insurance policy. Subsequently pur
chased mutual fund shares could be similarly pledged to obtain new
loans to finance renewal premiums. Customers were required to main
tain a prescribed ratio of collateral to their loans. This arrangement
offered investors the opportunity to purchase mutual fund shares in
anticipation that dividends and appreciation would exceed the interest
cost of the loan used to pay insurance premiums. Investors sometimes
purchased more mutual fund shares than were required under the
“program,” expecting to use the excess investment to collateralize fu
ture loans to pay insurance premiums for subsequent years.
EFCA and three of its subsidiaries, a broker-dealer organization,
a marketing organization and an insurance underwriter, were principally
involved in this operation. The mutual fund shares were sold through
Equity Funding Securities Corporation (EFSC) and insurance was mar
keted by Equity Funding Corporation-California (EFC-Cal). After
1967 the insurance was issued in most instances by Equity Funding Life
Insurance Company (EFLIC), although EFC-Cal also marketed insur
ance of unrelated companies, both separately and under the “program.”
The Trustee determined that loans receivable from “program”
sales (funded loans receivable) were legally assets of EFCA. However,
since EFC-Cal maintained all funded loan records and dealt directly
with policyholder/borrowers, funded loan transactions for purposes of
simplicity are treated throughout this report as transactions of EFC-Cal
rather than of EFCA.
EFSC’s income was derived from commissions on sales of mutual
fund shares while EFC-Cal’s income was derived from commissions on
sales of insurance. On mutual fund sales, EFSC generally received a
7% dealer’s commission, 50% of which went to the selling agent. Thus,
EFSC’s books showed commission income from transactions equal to
7% of the offering price, commission expense equal to 3.5% and an
increase in cash of 3.5% . The difference between the offering price
and the 7% commission retained by EFSC was paid to the mutual
fund distributor to purchase the participants’ shares.
On “program” insurance written by EFLIC, EFC-Cal’s commis
sions were substantially equal to the first year’s premium and were pay
able in the first year. Therefore, in a policy’s first year no cash was
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actually transferred between EFC-Cal and EFLIC in payment of the
premium and commission, respectively, since the amount of the pre
mium payable to EFLIC was offset by the amount of the commission
due to EFC-Cal for sale of the policy. In subsequent policy years,
EFLIC was entitled to receive the gross insurance premiums because
no commissions were payable on renewal premiums. Since on “pro
gram” sales EFC-Cal received promissory notes rather than cash from
policyholders, cash was raised by bank borrowings. The bank loans
were secured by the policyholder notes and the mutual fund shares
with which those notes were collateralized.
Thus “program” sales by EFC-Cal of EFLIC policies would be
reflected on EFC-Cal’s books in the first year by an intercompany
payable to EFLIC for the premium and an offsetting receivable from
EFLIC for the commissions; and on EFLIC’s books by intercompany
receivables and payables for the same items. EFC-Cal would in the first
year record income in the amount of the commission and a correspond
ing increase in funded loans receivable. Correspondingly, EFLIC
would reflect premium income and commissions paid and its inventory
of insurance in force would be increased for the policies written.
In subsequent years, premiums received by EFC-Cal, again in the
form of promissory notes, would be similarly recorded as an inter
company payable to EFLIC. At the time a policyholder’s loan was
increased for the renewal premium, an entry would be made on
EFC-Cal’s books increasing funded loans receivable, with an offsetting
increase in the amount payable to EFLIC. EFLIC, on the other hand,
would record the amount of the gross premium as an intercompany
receivable from EFC-Cal, and as renewal premium income.
The intercompany accounts were settled through the parent, EFCA,
and not directly between the subsidiary entities. Settlements were made
before year-end because in the case of EFLIC intercompany receivables
are “non-admitted” assets for regulatory purposes. Such receivables are
not treated as assets in determining whether minimum statutory capital
requirements applicable to life insurance companies have been met.
It was the practice of EFLIC to reinsure with other insurance com
panies all or a portion of the risks on insurance policies it had issued.
These reinsurers paid EFLIC approximately 180% of the first year’s
premium on reinsured policies. Since EFLIC retained the first year
premiums, reinsurers actually paid cash equal to approximately 80%
of the first year’s premium on reinsured policies. The reinsurers then
assumed responsibility for future benefits and claims on these policies.
This enabled EFLIC to reduce its liability for future benefits and claims
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to policyholders. Under the reinsurance agreements, EFLIC remained
responsible for collecting subsequent years’ premiums, for which it re
ceived a service charge. In many instances, EFLIC guaranteed a “per
sistency rate”— that is, the proportion of the policies on which premiums
would continue to be paid— as high as 85% in the policies’ second year.
Cash receipts from reinsurers, approximately 80% of the first
year’s premium on reinsured policies, provided EFLIC with substantial
cash flow and increased earnings.
General Description of the Fraud
Prior to 1971 Equity Funding personnel began falsifying records
to improve reported income and increase assets— presumably for the
purpose of maintaining and encouraging the market for EFCA’s securi
ties. The falsification consisted of a number of elements; the two most
significant involved the recording of fictitious funded loans receivable,
which appears to have begun as early as 1964, and the recording of
fictitious insurance policies, which began in 1969.
During the years 1964 through 1969 EFC-Cal’s books were falsi
fied to show increases in funded loans receivable and commission income
accounts which purported to represent the company’s participation in
commissions earned by brokerage houses from various “program”
securities transactions. Supposedly because it was improper for the
company to receive such reciprocal commissions, they were disguised as
funded loans receivable in EFCA’s financial statements.
After 1969, a different approach to falsifying funded loans and
commission income was adopted. This involved the recording of false
receivables purporting to reflect loans made to pay policy premiums
and recording a corresponding amount of fictitious commission income.
EFC-Cal was generally not entitled to receive commissions on
renewal premiums; however, it appears that such premiums on fictitious
policies were improperly recorded as commissions earned. EFC-Cal’s
commission income account was further falsified to reflect commissions
on fictitious sales of mutual fund shares. Since EFSC sold most of the
mutual fund shares used to secure the funded loans receivable, commis
sions on such sales would normally be recorded on its books and not on
EFC-Cal’s books.
As of the date of bankruptcy, April 5, 1973, fictitious funded loans
receivable amounted to approximately $62.3 million.
Other fictitious or fraudulently inflated assets, principally in the
form of receivables and investments approximating $37.7 million, were
recorded on the books of EFCA and EFC-Cal. The recording of sub
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stantially all of these fictitious assets resulted in direct or indirect reduc
tion of other fictitious asset accounts, especially funded loans receivable.
Beginning in 1969 EFLIC’s records were falsified to reflect an
increase in the insurance in force. This falsification did not by itself
result in the recording of net income to EFLIC in the first year of the
fictitious policies. However, when EFLIC reinsured the fictitious poli
cies, the cash received (approximately 80% of the purported first year’s
premiums) was recognized as gross income. Reinsurance of fictitious
policies made it necessary for EFLIC to make payment of subsequent
years’ premiums on those policies to the reinsurers. The need for cash
to make these payments led to the creation of still more fictitious poli
cies which were also reinsured, with much of the cash generated from
the reinsurance being applied to payment of premiums attributable to
fictitious policies reinsured in prior years.
Thus, in the absence of other sources of cash flow, each year’s
fraud required an even larger fraud the following year, with the magni
tude of the falsification pyramiding from year to year.
The falsifications on EFLIC and EFC-Cal records represented two
separate efforts to inflate assets and income. Fictitious transactions
which would normally have required corresponding entries on the
records of the two entities were not correlated either as to their nature
or as to the amounts involved, and documentation supporting the falsi
fications apparently was not prepared except when requested by the
auditors.
EFLIC’s intercompany accounts would generally show a substan
tial net receivable balance, created by transfers of cash to EFCA and
by the excess of premiums owed it by EFC-Cal over commissions
EFLIC owed to EFC-Cal. In 1971, EFCA settled such accounts by a
cash transfer of $16 million to EFLIC. This transfer was falsely re
corded by EFCA as a purchase of commercial paper. In 1972, the
books of EFLIC reflected an intercompany account receivable of $24
million. This balance was supposedly paid by the transfer of marketable
securities from EFCA to EFLIC. These securities, like the insurance
policies, funded loans and commercial paper, were fictitious. In 1972,
EFCA also recorded fictitious purchases of commercial paper totaling
$8 million in order to bring its intercompany accounts into balance with
those of its subsidiaries.
The Magnitude of the Fraud
The magnitude of the fraud is indicated by the following summary
of fictitious or fraudulently inflated assets based on the February 22,
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1974, report of the Trustee. (When these items are discussed here
after, some of the dollar amounts vary slightly because they represent
the balances as of December 31, 1972, while the Trustee’s report
reflects amounts as of April 5, 1973.)
(millions)
Inflated funded loans receivable
Other fictitious or fraudulently inflated assets:
Receivable from Compania de Estudios y
Asuntos (Estudios)
Receivable from Establissement Grandson
(Grandson)
Investment in commercial paper— Apatinska
Tekstilna Industrijia (Apatex)
Capitalized mineral exploration costs
Receivable from insurance companies and
agents
Receivable originating from the sale of cas
ualty insurance agency operation
Investment in Bishops Bank
Receivables from mutual funds
Write off by EFCA of carrying value of invest
ment in EFLIC (see discussion of fictitious
securities recorded on books of EFCA and
EFLIC in 1971 and 1972 in connection
with the elimination of intercompany ac
counts)
Non-existent investments in commercial paper
Total

$ 62.3

$12.7
9.1
2.0
1.8
5.9
2.9
2.7
.6

37.7

35.4
8.0
$143.4

The Trustee also adjusted other accounts by $42.1 million repre
senting write-downs of assets and other adjustments not necessarily
related to fictitious or fraudulently inflated assets; thus, net assets were
reduced by a total of $185.5 million.
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Chapter 3
T he Nature of the Fraud
And How It Was Accomplished

As stated in Chapter 1, the fraud at Equity Funding began as
early as 1964. However, the committee generally limited its study
to the pertinent entities for the years 1971 and 1972 since the general
pattern of the fraud which had appeared in earlier years or in 1973
could be identified without extending the review beyond these two years.
Funded Loans Receivable
The falsification of funded loans receivable accounts and corres
ponding commission accounts was accomplished in a simple manner.
The general ledger control accounts were falsified by recording fictitious
journal entries and there was virtually no attempt to create supporting
documentation. For example, the subsidiary loan accounts were not
falsified to correlate with the general ledger control account; neither
were memoranda collateral records prepared to support the required
ratio of collateral to funded loans receivable.
At the end of 1971 and 1972, funded loans receivable accounted
for about 14% of Equity Funding’s total consolidated assets. In 1971,
approximately $34 million of the loans— 49% —were fictitious; and in
1972, $61 million— 61% . A related amount of collateral in each year
was also non-existent.
The sale by EFC-Cal of insurance policies involving funded loans
receivable generated commission income and expense. False sales of
17

funding programs were recorded by fictitiously increasing the funded
loans receivable account with corresponding increases in the commission
income accounts. Although commission income from sales of insurance
and mutual fund shares normally would have resulted in incurring com
mission expense, the commission expense accounts do not appear to
have been falsified so as to maintain their expected relationship to
commission income. However, other expenses were apparently reclassi
fied as commission expense when data for the various entities were
consolidated, so that the consolidated financial statements reflected the
expected relationship.
Interest income on funded loans was recorded monthly by EFCCal on the aggregate loan balance and was therefore overstated to the
extent it was computed on fictitious loans.
During the examination of EFCA’s 1972 financial statements,
EFC-Cal personnel used the computer to prepare, for the auditor’s
use, a detailed trial balance listing all the individual loans supposedly
included in the total of the funded loans receivable general ledger con
trol account. This false trial balance was created by listing the legitimate
loans a sufficient number of times until the desired total was reached.
To avoid detection of this duplication, the listing omitted borrowers’
names and the first two digits of each five-digit loan number. Although
the trial balance contained numerous duplications, each line item could
be supported by genuine documents (principally the power of attorney
and promissory notes signed by the borrower) contained in a legitimate
individual loan file. There was, however, the risk that the auditors, in
selecting individual loans for testing from the trial balance, would
select the same loan more than once. The committee was informed
that when this occurred company personnel presented either genuine
documentation for other loans having the same balance and a loan
number with the same last three digits, or counterfeit documentation.
A deceptive measure was also apparently taken by company
personnel in connection with the auditors’ direct confirmation of se
lected loans with the borrowers. The committee was informed that when
the loan selected by the auditors was fictitious (that is, a repetitive list
ing of a genuine loan also selected for confirmation), a confirmation
request would be prepared and addressed to company personnel or their
friends who were instructed to make appropriate response. Thus,
through collusion, the risk of exceptions to confirmation requests was
minimized.
Such preventive measures to avoid detection of the fraud were
not, however, systematically carried out in the books of EFC-Cal.

18

Journal entries recording fictitious commission income on EFC-Cal’s
books were not consistent with EFC-Cal’s method of operation in at
least two ways. First, large amounts of commission on supposed sales
of mutual fund shares were recorded by journal entries which inex
plicably increased funded loans receivable. Commissions on mutual
fund sales would normally be received in cash, not by an increase in
notes receivable from customers. Furthermore as previously noted,
commissions from the sales of mutual fund shares would be expected
to be recorded on the books of EFSC, not EFC-Cal. Secondly, EFCCal recorded additions to funded loans receivable representing gross
renewal premiums on program policies as insurance commission in
come. Since EFC-Cal was not entitled to receive commissions on the
renewal of EFLIC policies, all such additions to funded loans receivable
should have been recorded as payable to EFLIC instead of as commis
sion income.
Other Fictitious Assets
Related to Funded Loans Receivable
At the date of bankruptcy the accounts of EFC-Cal reflected the
following fictitious assets which were created by journal entries that
directly or indirectly reduced fictitious funded loans receivable by a
corresponding amount:
• a receivable of $12.7 million from a Panamanian company,
Estudios,
• a note receivable of $9.1 million from a Liechtenstein company,
Grandson,
• an investment of $2 million in commercial paper of a Yugo
slavian company, Apatex,
• capitalized mineral exploration costs of $1.8 million.
The manner in which the receivables from Estudios and Grandson
were recorded raises questions about their validity. The bookkeeping
entries relating to these receivables are summarized in the following
paragraphs.
During 1969 and 1970 EFC-Cal’s purported right to receive com
missions on “programs” established in prior years was recorded as
“contractual receivable” and commission income was increased by
approximately the same amount. During 1970, the “contractual re
ceivable” were ostensibly sold for $18 million to Estudios, a company
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which the Trustee has determined was secretly controlled by EFCA.
It appears that the purpose of these entries was merely to present a
picture of ever-increasing earnings and assets.
The original Estudios receivable of $18 million was reduced to
approximately $12.7 million by the end of 1972 apparently by treating
an unrelated $2 million cash transfer from Bishops Bank, another
EFCA subsidiary, as though it were a payment on this receivable and
by applying actual commissions received on sales made in prior periods.
In 1969, EFCA borrowed approximately $9.1 million through an
international brokerage firm. The proceeds of the loan were not re
corded as a liability but were recorded instead as a reduction of funded
loans receivable. The committee was informed that the liability was not
recorded until the lender subsequently asked why the obligation did not
appear on the borrowers’ financial statements. The liability was then
recorded in 1970 with an offsetting charge to a new asset account pur
porting to represent a loan receivable from Grandson. The net effect
of these entries was to reduce funded loans receivable and create a new
fictitious asset of a corresponding amount. The Trustee has determined
that, like Estudios, Grandson was secretly controlled by EFCA. The
purpose of these entries appears to have been concealment of the fraud
and manipulation of earnings.
The committee has been informed that there are agreements in
EFCA’s files to document these non-interest bearing receivables from
Estudios and Grandson. Attempts by the Trustee to locate the corporate
officers, obtain financial statements or identify any operations by either
company have been unsuccessful. The committee understands that the
receivables due from Estudios and Grandson are worthless and that the
companies are corporate shells without assets.
The creation of the investment in the commercial paper of Apatex
appears to be related to the $2 million transfer from Bishops Bank to
EFC-Cal, which was recorded as a down payment on the sale of the
“contractuals receivable” to Estudios. Subsequent to this transfer, the
$2 million was repaid to Bishops Bank and the disbursement improperly
recorded as a purchase of Apatex commercial paper. Bishops normally
traded in the commercial paper of Apatex and apparently supplied a
false purchase advice indicating that the securities were being held by
Bishops for safekeeping. These transactions resulted in the substitution
of what the Trustee has determined to be a fictitious investment in
Apatex for a fictitious receivable due from Estudios in the amount of
$2 million and were apparently designed to make it appear that the
Estudios note was collectible.
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In November 1970, journal entries further reduced EFC-Cal’s
funded loans receivable by $1.8 million and in effect created another
fictitious asset in the form of capitalized mineral exploration costs. As
with most of the other journal entries discussed above, supporting
documentation for these entries cannot be found. Again, the purpose
of these entries appears to have been concealment of the fraud and
manipulation of earnings.
Fictitious Insurance Policies
The key element of this aspect of the fraud, which began in 1969,
was the falsification of EFLIC’s records to indicate that policies had
been issued and continued in existence. The extent of the falsification
can be best appreciated when viewed in terms of statistics regarding
life insurance in force. Of the $2.2 billion in life insurance policies
shown to be in force by EFLIC at December 31, 1971, approximately
$1.3 billion were fictitious. Of the $3.2 billion in life insurance policies
shown to be in force a year later, approximately $2.1 billion were
fictitious. Substantially all of the fictitious policies were reinsured with
other life insurance companies.
Although the use of the computer to produce fictitious records is
discussed later in this report, the following brief description of its use at
EFLIC will be helpful. In 1972 (and perhaps in earlier years as well),
the computer was used to reconstruct EFLIC’s journals, insurance in
force files, and the general ledger for the entire year, so as to spread
the fictitious entries in an apparently normal fashion. This seems to
have been done to avoid the suspicion which might have been aroused
by recording all of the fictitious business in a single month or quarter.
This reconstruction could have been achieved even if the records were
maintained manually. However, an enormous amount of clerical work
would have been involved. The use of the computer made the recon
struction much easier.
To further conceal the fictitious insurance policies:
• The liability for future policyholder benefits was duly cal
culated on the basis of the supposed total insurance in force
which had not been reinsured.
• Deferred acquisition costs for the fictitious policies which had
not been reinsured were recorded as though the policies had
been genuine.
• State insurance premium taxes were paid to the appropriate
taxing authorities on fictitious as well as genuine policies.
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• Expenses were falsified to give the appearance that a normal
relationship existed between premium income and such expense
accounts as commissions, credit reports and medical fees.
• Records were further falsified to manifest a pattern of termina
tion and death claims on the fictitious policies. Since substanti
ally all of these policies were reinsured, a major object was to
deceive the reinsurers.
Other measures were also taken to conceal the falsification. When,
in the course of audit, fictitious transactions (including legitimate
policies which had been terminated but were maintained as though
they were still in force) were selected for audit testing, EFLIC person
nel either created bogus documentation— including copies of policies,
applications and medical reports— or produced documents relating to
legitimate policies which had been terminated.
EFLIC’s premium income and commission expense accounts were
inflated to correspond with the volume of fictitious policies. This opera
tion was rendered easier than would normally have been the case for an
insurance underwriter by the fact that virtually all the transactions
passed through an affiliated entity— EFC-Cal. That is, most premiums
were receivable from EFC-Cal, and commission expenses were pay
able to EFC-Cal. In most instances there were no direct dealings by
the underwriter, EFLIC, either with its policyholders (with respect to
premium payments) or with the salesmen who sold its policies; rather,
these transactions were conducted through its marketing affiliate, EFCCal. Nor was there a direct flow of cash with respect to either pre
miums or commissions on “program” business; rather these were
accumulated and reflected in offsetting intercompany accounts which
were purportedly settled by lump-sum payments to EFLIC.
While the recording of fictitious life insurance sales by EFLIC
and of fictitious funded loans receivable by EFC-Cal might superficially
appear to be a single, integrated fraud, they were really two separate
schemes to inflate assets and income. In fact, EFC-Cal’s inflation of
funded loans receivable apparently commenced well before EFLIC
was acquired by EFCA.
Fictitious Securities Transactions and Their
Relation to Intercompany Account Balances
As has been explained, intercompany receivables and payables
between EFC-Cal and EFLIC, arising from their complementary roles
in sales of the “Equity Funding Program,” were cleared through their
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common parent, EFCA. Clearance was desirable before year-end for
EFLIC because, for life insurance regulatory purposes, receivables
from affiliated companies are “non-admitted assets” which are de
ducted from equity in determining statutory capital.
As discussed earlier, the transactions recorded in the intercompany
accounts between EFLIC and EFCA were not correlated, and as a
result the balances in the accounts were not equal and offsetting. To
bring the accounts into balance, a series of fictitious purchases and
sales of commercial paper and bonds was recorded at the end of both
1971 and 1972. The net result of these entries was as follows:
1971
EFCA Books
$19 million
Investments inflated
Balance due from EFLIC decreased
EFLIC Books
Investments inflated
Balance due from EFCA decreased (16 million)
Books of Other Subsidiaries
Balance due from EFCA decreased
(3 million)

1972
$ 8 million
(8 million)
24 million
(24 million)

To document fictitious investments, company personnel prepared
fictitious brokerage advices reflecting purported purchases and indicat
ing that securities were being held in safekeeping at a commercial
bank.
EFCA also advised EFLIC on regular interest payment dates that
interest was received on the investments. EFLIC’s records duly re
flected this interest income with a corresponding increase in its inter
company account receivable from EFCA.
At the end of 1972 the auditors’ request for confirmation of certain
securities represented as being held in safekeeping by the bank was
addressed by company personnel to a mail drop set up under a name
similar to the bank so company personnel would receive the request,
sign the confirmation and return it to the auditors.
Other Fictitious or Fraudulently Inflated Assets
At the date of bankruptcy the accounts of EFCA reflected the
following additional fictitious or fraudulently inflated assets:
• a $5.9 million receivable from insurance companies and agents,
• a $2.9 million note receivable from the sale of future profits
on casualty insurance agency operations,
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• a $2.7 million investment in Bishops Bank, and
• a $600,000 receivable from mutual funds.
The creation of the $5.9 million receivable from insurance com
panies and agents was accomplished piecemeal. Prior to 1970, journal
entries, for which no supporting documentation can be found, were
recorded on the books of EFC-Cal creating a receivable due from
insurance companies approximating $4 million and effectively increas
ing income by a like amount. This portion of the receivable balance
apparently remained unchanged after it was recorded. The $1.9 million
remainder represents unreconciled differences between the control ac
count and detail records supporting amounts due from agents. Although
these differences existed for some time, the discrepancy was never
charged off.
The $2.9 million notes receivable originated from the sale of
future profits on casualty insurance agency operations of an EFCA
subsidiary. Although there are documents in the files relating to this
transaction, they provide, with minor exceptions, that payments are to
be made only to the extent that the agency operation generated profits.
The transaction appears not to have been a completed sale (although it
was so recorded) giving rise to income at the time of the transaction.
In addition, one of the journal entries recording the receivable for a
significant portion of the sale reduced asset accounts unrelated to the
casualty agency operation.
Bishops Bank was acquired by EFCA in May 1969. During
1970, a $2.1 million fictitious cash account with Bishops Bank and
fictitious investments in subsidiaries amounting to $600,000 were cre
ated by means of journal entries which effectively increased EFCA’s
income by $2.7 million. In December 1970 journal entries were made
substituting a $2.7 million intangible asset in the nature of goodwill
(i.e., cost of the investment in Bishops Bank in excess of net assets
acquired) for the non-existent cash account and fictitious investment
accounts.
During 1972, a $600,000 receivable from mutual funds was re
corded on EFCA’s books with an offsetting credit to commission
income. The committee was informed that documentation supporting
the receivable does not exist.
Use of the Computer to Produce Fictitious Records
During the later years bookkeeping and accounting records, in
cluding general ledgers, of EFCA and its subsidiaries were prepared
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almost entirely by use of a computer. Nonetheless, the fraud was not
based on a sophisticated application of data processing technology.
The principal falsifications were achieved by manually preparing ficti
tious journal entries and recording them on the books of certain Equity
Funding companies. However, the computer was used to prepare
records in support of some of the fictitious account balances. An
enormous amount of clerical effort would have been required to create
the supporting detail manually.
Much of the publicity about Equity Funding has characterized
it as a “computer fraud.” It would be more accurate to call it a “com
puter-assisted fraud.” The computer was used, to a large extent, to
manipulate files and create detail designed to conceal the fraud. Much
of this processing was performed by personnel from outside the EDP
department who were allowed access to computer hardware, software
and files.
The computer was an important factor in carrying out measures
to conceal the fraud, but was not essential to the commission of the
basic fraudulent acts.
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Chapter 4
Conclusions and Recommendations Regarding
T he Adequacy of Auditing Standards and
Procedures Currently Applied in the
Examination of Financial Statements
General Conclusion
From its review, the committee has concluded that, except for
certain observations relating to confirmation of insurance in force and
auditing related party transactions, generally accepted auditing stan
dards are adequate and that no changes are called for in the procedures
commonly used by auditors. In reaching this conclusion, the commit
tee is aware that it is possible to hypothesize ways in which virtually
any audit procedure may be thwarted. Nevertheless, the committee
believes that customary audit procedures properly applied would have
provided a reasonable degree of assurance that the existence of fraud
at Equity Funding would be detected.
The nature, extent and timing of audit procedures are normally
based on a study and evaluation of the system of internal control in
existence in the area under examination. While such procedures would
not necessarily reveal a fraud, it appears that internal accounting and
administrative controls at Equity Funding were so weak as to raise
concern about the reliability of the accounting records. The committee
believes that in such circumstances customary procedures would be
extended because of the internal control weakness, thereby enhancing
the likelihood of detecting fraud.
The remainder of this chapter sets forth some of the audit pro
cedures which the committee believes would customarily be applied
in the circumstances in testing the validity of certain accounts in which
fraudulent entries were made at Equity Funding. Each section heading
indicates the areas toward which the selected audit procedures would
be primarily directed. However, these audit procedures might have
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uncovered misstatements in related areas as well. For example, dis
covery of overstatements in the funded loan account might have led to
the discovery of overstatements in the insurance in force, in commission
income and in other related accounts. Similarly, discovery of an
illogical relationship between commission income and commission ex
pense might have led to discovery of the overstatement of funded loans.
Fictitious Funded Loans Receivable
The committee believes that the following customary audit pro
cedures taken together would provide a reasonable degree of assur
ance that fictitious funded loans receivable would be detected:
• Prepare under the auditor’s control a trial balance of funded
loans receivable showing borrowers’ names, full account num
bers and balances.
• Reconcile the trial balance total with the general ledger control
account balance and ascertain the propriety of any reconciling
items.
• Review on a test basis the entries recording additions and
deductions in the funded loans receivable account and examine
documentation supporting the changes.
• Request on a test basis confirmation from borrowers of loan
balances and amount of collateral pledged.
• On a test basis, inspect, or request confirmation from cus
todians of, mutual fund shares pledged as collateral by individ
ual borrowers.
The auditor could carry out the above audit procedures relating
to the trial balance and confirmation of funded loans receivable manu
ally or through the use of computer programs designed for that pur
pose. If a client’s computer programs were utilized the auditor would
review and test such programs to the extent necessary to satisfy himself
that they would produce valid data. To conduct such a review an
auditor should have adequate technical training and proficiency in EDP
techniques.
Fictitious Commission Income and Expense
The committee believes that the following customary auditing
procedures taken together would provide a reasonable degree of as
surance that fictitious EFC-Cal commission income and expense would
be detected:
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• Select a sample from the additions to the commission income
account and trace the origin of such additions to supporting
detail. Recalculate commissions earned on a test basis.
• Select a sample from the additions to the commission expense
account and trace the origin of such additions to supporting
detail. Recalculate commission expense on a test basis.
• Determine whether a logical relationship exists between insur
ance commission income and insurance commission expense.
• Test other major sources of commission income by examining
supporting documentation or by confirming with the sources of
such income.
• Review propriety of consolidation elimination and reclassifica
tion entries affecting insurance commission income and expense.
• Test overall reasonableness of insurance commission income by
comparing it with first year and renewal premium data.
In the audit of commission income and expense the auditor would
be cognizant of the relationship between premium volume and insur
ance commissions. An awareness of this relationship and more particu
larly, an awareness of that portion of premium volume attributable to
first year sales as distinguished from renewals would permit the auditor
to determine the overall reasonableness of recorded insurance commis
sion revenue. Similarly, the overall propriety of recorded insurance
commission expense would be established in light of gross premium or
commission income and the provisions of agents’ commission contracts.
Fictitious Life Insurance Policies
The committee believes that the following customary auditing
procedures taken together would provide a reasonable degree of
assurance that fictitious life insurance policies included in the inventory
of insurance in force would be detected:
• On a test basis trace policies included in the inventory of insur
ance in force to the related premium collection.
• On a test basis trace premium income to premium collections
and the related policies to the inventory of insurance in force.
Since EFLIC received no cash when it wrote new “program” poli
cies, premiums could not be traced to specifically identifiable cash
collections within its own records. Premiums on such policies were
merely recorded as a charge to EFLIC’s intercompany receivable due
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from EFC-Cal and immediately offset by a credit in the same amount
representing the first year commission. Thus, the only independent
evidence to support premiums on new “program” business was the note
receivable representing a loan made by EFC-Cal to finance the assured’s
premium.
Similar tests tracing evidence of billing and collection would be
applied to renewal premiums. Again, in the case of “program” sales,
such premiums were added to income and charged by EFLIC to its
intercompany account receivable due from EFC-Cal. While the inter
company account balances were settled periodically, settlements were
made on a lump sum basis making it impossible to trace specific
premiums to specific cash collections as would customarily be the case.
To perform these audit tests it would be necessary to work with
the records of both EFLIC and EFC-Cal, since EFC-Cal maintained
the related loan account and billing and commission records in con
nection with its sales of EFLIC policies. Entries recording premium
income and commission expense on EFLIC’s books for policies sold
by EFC-Cal were based solely on intercompany advices from EFC-Cal.
Thus, an auditor could not trace premiums on “program” policies to
evidence of billing and collection without gaining access to EFC-Cal’s
records. Under these circumstances, the auditor of EFLIC would
either test the records of EFC-Cal himself or, if the two companies
engaged separate auditors, EFLIC’s auditor might request and rely
upon EFC-Cal’s auditor to carry out tests using data supplied by him
from EFLIC’s inventory of policies in force. In addition, EFC-Cal’s
commission income and premiums remitted would be compared on a
test basis with premium income and commission expense on EFLIC’s
books to see if they corresponded.
Another auditing procedure, which heretofore has not been con
sidered particularly useful, is verification of the authenticity of a selected
number of policies included in the in force inventory by direct confirma
tion with the policyholders. Such a procedure has not generally been
considered necessary because it would be unusual for companies to
overstate liabilities. Inflation of the inventory of life insurance in
force by a company that follows statutory accounting would result in
an overstatement of the liability for future policyholder benefits and a
reduction in current earnings. However, when companies report on
the basis of generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) there
could be motivation for overstating insurance in force because it
could result in an addition to current earnings.
There could be an additional motivation for overstating insurance
in force when reinsurance of policies has the effect of materially increas
ing current earnings, which can occur when a company reports on the
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basis of either GAAP or statutory accounting. Reinsurance of life
insurance policies permits the elimination of the related liability for
future policyholder benefits. Under certain circumstances, reinsurance
may also result in increasing current earnings to the extent that the
proceeds received from reinsurance exceed expenses incurred in con
nection with the sale and servicing of the reinsured policies.
EFLIC reinsured substantial numbers of both bona fide and fictitious
policies. Thus, fictitiously inflating the in force inventory, coupled
with the manner in which reinsurance commissions were accounted for,
resulted in substantially increasing EFLIC’s reported earnings.
The committee believes that when current earnings of a company
could be materially increased as a result of either the reinsurance of
policies or reporting on the basis of GAAP, there may be occasions
when policies should be confirmed with policyholders on a test basis.
Nevertheless, the committee cautions against placing too much reliance
on such confirmation procedures as a sole means of determining the
reasonableness of the in force inventory since such procedures cannot
be expected to disclose unrecorded policies.
The committee recommends, therefore, that the Institute’s auditing
standards executive committee consider whether the Life Insurance
Audit Guide requires clarification with regard to the confirmation of
policies with policyholders.

Fictitious Securities Transactions
As discussed in Chapter 3, fictitious purchases of investments were
recorded in 1971 and 1972 by EFCA and EFLIC to substitute for
intercompany account balances between EFCA and EFLIC. The
committee believes that the customary audit procedures of inspection of
the securities held by the company or confirmation of the securities in
safekeeping directly with an independent custodian would provide a
reasonable degree of assurance that the non-existence of securities would
be revealed.
In connection with the fictitious investments recorded on the books
of EFLIC at December 31, 1972, the Report of the Trustee of Equity
Funding Corporation of America dated October 31, 1974, states that
Equity Funding established an office in Chicago using a name very close
to that of American National Bank and Trust Co. by leasing space at a
different address under the name of “American National Trust.” The
report states:
From time to time thereafter, fraud participants sent letters ad
dressed to “American National Bank” at the mail drop address to ac
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custom post office employees to delivering mail so addressed to the
bogus location.
A print-out of the bogus bond portfolio was prepared on EFCA’s
System /3 computer, and was given to . . . (the auditors) during the
1972 audit to support purchases of $24 million of the bonds at
American National Bank. When the auditors also requested a direct
bank confirmation for the bogus bonds, a request for confirmation was
prepared, addressed to the fictitious branch office and given to them for
mailing. . . . (An officer of EFCA) went to Chicago to receive it at
the phony American National Bank branch. Nothing was received for
a period of several days, causing great consternation among the con
spirators who feared that the post office had delivered the request to
the real American National Bank and Trust Co. However, they later
learned that . . . (the auditors) simply forgot to mail the confirmation
request. . . . When the auditors’ confirmation finally arrived at the mail
drop . . . (an officer of EFCA) apparently signed and returned it to
them in Los Angeles. In this manner, the conspirators concealed the
$24 million imbalance in the intercompany account on EFLIC’s books
at year-end 1972.

While this points up the need for auditors to ascertain that valid
addresses are used, such a step is already a customary and integral
part of confirmation procedures.
An auditor customarily compares recorded security transactions
with supporting broker or bank advices. However, this procedure prob
ably would have been ineffective because certain advices had been
forged.
Other Fictitious Receivables and Fraudulently Inflated Assets
With respect to the receivables resulting from the sale of the
casualty insurance agency operation, the committee believes that the
following customary audit procedures taken together would raise serious
questions as to whether the receivables were valid:
• Analyze the accounts and review supporting data including
contracts or agreements.
• Examine recent financial statements and credit ratings of the
debtors to establish the financial standing of debtors.
• Confirm unpaid balances directly with the debtors.
Although the above auditing procedures would customarily be
applied to the Estudios and Grandson receivables, the committee is of
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the opinion that these procedures might have been ineffective in
detecting the fraudulent nature of these accounts since the Trustee has
determined that both companies were secretly controlled by EFCA.
These audit procedures could have been circumvented through manage
ment collusion.
As to the investment in the commercial paper of Apatex, the
committee is of the opinion that customary auditing procedures
(described in the section Fictitious Securities Transactions) might not
have disclosed that the asset was fictitious. This opinion is based on
the following:
1. Forged purchase advices were available for inspection.
2. The commercial paper was supposedly held by Bishops Bank, an
EFCA subsidiary. Confirmation from the bank that it was holding
the paper would not have furnished adequate audit evidence because
the bank was not an independent custodian.
3. The bank made a market in this commercial paper and may have
had such securities on hand for sale. Accordingly, inspection of
$2 million of Apatex commercial paper would have given no
assurance that the paper inspected was the property of EFC-Cal.
Circumstances such as those which were present regarding the
Estudios, Grandson and Apatex accounts highlight the fact that trans
actions between related parties pose serious auditing problems. The
committee did not attempt to reach any conclusions regarding the
problems inherent in auditing such transactions since the auditing stan
dards executive committee of the AICPA is currently studying the need
for additional auditing procedures in connection with related party
transactions.
With respect to the $5.9 million receivable from insurance com
panies and from agents, the committee believes that the following cus
tomary auditing procedures taken together would provide a reasonable
degree of assurance that the highly questionable nature of the accounts
would be disclosed.
As to the approximately $4 million receivable from insurance
companies:
• Analyze the account balance (which would have shown that it
had remained unchanged for several years).
•

R eview com m ission collections early in the subsequent year
which were applicable to the year-end balance under audit.
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As to the approximately $1.9 million receivable from agents
representing unreconciled differences between the control account total
and total of the subsidiary records:
• Review the company’s method of clearing unreconciled differ
ences.
• Inquire as to why the difference had not been written off.
With respect to the inflated investment in Bishop’s Bank, the com
mittee is of the opinion that customary auditing procedures would
have included a review of the net change in the “goodwill” account
which was recorded on the books of EFCA. Such a review would
provide a reasonable degree of assurance that the inflated account
would be discovered.
In regard to the capitalized mineral exploration costs, the commit
tee believes that an attempt to review data supporting the journal entries
which gave rise to deferral of such costs would provide reasonable
assurance that the impropriety of the asset would be discovered.
Use of the Computer
In the opinion of the committee, a knowledge of computer audit
techniques was not essential to the detection of the Equity Funding
fraud. Manual application of customary auditing procedures would
have provided a reasonable degree of assurance that the fraud would
be uncovered.
The committee also believes that the fraud did not contain any
elements that involved new or unique computer applications. Thus,
no recommendations are made for any new auditing standards or pro
cedures in regard to computer maintained financial records.
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Chapter 5
Responsibility of Auditors for Detection of Fraud

The extensive fraud at Equity Funding raises fundamental concept
ual and practical questions about the responsibility of auditors for
detection of fraud, and about the understanding of that responsibility by
both the accounting profession and the public. The committee believes
it should address these questions even though it has concluded that
no significant changes in generally accepted auditing standards and
procedures are necessary in the light of Equity Funding.
The understanding of the public accounting profession as to its
responsibility for detection of fraud is set forth in Statement on Auditing
Standards No. 1, in sections 110.05, .06, .07 and .08, which are
reproduced in the Appendix. The propositions contained in that State
ment relate to the ten generally accepted auditing standards, which
govern the auditor’s work in examining financial statements. One of
these standards requires that the auditor make a proper study and
evaluation of internal control as a basis for reliance thereon and for
the determination of the extent of the tests to which auditing procedures
are to be restricted. Thus, in the presence of weakness in internal
control, the auditor recognizes the possibility that fraud could go un
detected; and, correspondingly, modification of the nature, extent and
timing of audit tests may be considered necessary.
The ten standards also require adequate technical training and
proficiency as an auditor, independence in mental attitude, exercise of
due professional care, adequate planning and supervision, and sufficient
competent evidential matter to support the auditor’s opinion on the
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financial statements being examined. The auditor’s report explicity
states whether his examination has met these standards.
In meeting these standards, the auditor’s attitude is one of aware
ness of the possibility of fraud. Many customary auditing procedures,
though not specifically aimed at fraud detection, are nonetheless designed
to test the reliability of the books and records and may raise questions
as to the possibility of fraud. If the auditor suspects that there is a
lack of honesty affecting the records or financial statements, he should
modify the nature, extent and timing of his tests so as to either confirm
or dispel his suspicion.
Although an auditor’s unqualified opinion provides a degree of
assurance that there is no material fraud, the committee believes that
there is a risk that the opinion may be misunderstood as providing a
higher degree of assurance as to the absence of fraud than can reason
ably be expected. If such misunderstanding is to be avoided, it is im
portant that the inescapable limitations on an audit be understood.
SAS No. 1, section 110.06, states that the auditor cannot give
assurance that all types of fraud have been detected even when the
most extensive audit has been conducted. Three examples are given:
forgery, collusion and unrecorded transactions.
Forgery may be employed as to signatures and other signs of
authenticity, or to entire documents. Throughout history skillful forgers
have eluded detection even by experts; and auditors cannot reasonably
be expected to be handwriting or documentary experts.
Collusion— as between client personnel and outsiders, or among
management or employees of the client—may result in the presentation
to the auditor of falsified confirmations or other documents that appear
genuine. If the auditor has no reason to suspect the genuineness of the
documents, it would be reasonable for him to rely on them. In a scheme
to conceal fraud, of course, there is likely to be a combination of
forgery and collusion.
Finally, auditing techniques cannot provide assurance that there
are no unrecorded transactions. For example, a payable may be con
cealed, and little short of requesting confirmation from every possible
creditor would provide assurance of its discovery.
In addition to the foregoing limitations which are largely insur
mountable, there are practical and economic limitations on the degree
of assurance that auditors can reasonably be expected to provide. An
ordinary audit is not an examination of every transaction and of every
document relating to every transaction; rather, an audit involves a test
ing of transactions and of the related underlying records and other docu
ments. The nature, extent and timing of the testing depend upon a

36

number of factors, including the auditor’s study and evaluation of the
client’s internal control, the results of particular tests, the importance
of particular items being tested, and whether grounds for suspicion of
fraud are discovered in the course of the audit. In the usual case, to
substitute for such an examination one covering every transaction and
record of the client would multiply the amount of work involved to an
impracticable degree.
“Detailed” audits, which may be undertaken for special purposes,
offer a greater likelihood of detecting fraud because they ordinarily
involve examination of larger numbers of individual items and trans
actions than the ordinary audit. Even in detailed audits, however, some
types of fraud may escape detection (e.g., unrecorded transactions,
forgery, or collusion) because there is necessarily a point where the
auditor’s inquiry stops.
In every audit, the auditor is expected to be aware of the possibility
of fraud. Nonetheless, there must come a point where, unless he has
reason for suspicion, the auditor accepts the truth of representations
made to him and the genuineness of documents which he inspects.
Examples of representations which would normally be accepted (in
the absence of specific reasons for suspicion) even though they might
be deliberately false would be representations by management as to the
completeness of a set of board or executive committee minutes; or by
the client’s counsel as to the absence of pending material litigation;
or by a debtor of the client as to the correctness of an account re
ceivable; or by a bank or depository as to the status of the client’s
accounts with it.
Yet there will almost always be some further step that could be
taken to corroborate the accuracy of the representation made to the
auditor. For example, a debtor’s response to a request for confirmation
of an account receivable could be checked by inspection of the debtor’s
records reflecting the corresponding account payable, or by a certificate
from the debtor’s auditor. If the representation is one of counsel, the
auditor could ask to inspect the pleadings in the case, he could examine
the court records, or he could require an opinion of his own counsel
with respect to the opinion of the client’s counsel, and so on. Each such
incremental step would add a degree of confidence, and yet in few
cases would it produce absolute certainty.
Similarly, there is a point where, again assuming that he has no
reason for suspicion, the auditor accepts the genuineness of documents:
as, for example, the genuineness of securities held by the client and
inspected by the auditor, even though these might be skillfully counter
feited; or of contracts or signatures on confirmations, although these
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might be forged; or of underlying internal documents, although the
availability of the client’s own forms often makes these relatively easy
to falsify. As to any such matter, there is ordinarily some further step
that could be taken to test the authenticity of a document on which re
liance is placed: the authority of a debtor’s officer or employee to sign a
confirmation could be authenticated; the genuineness of that person’s
signature could be verified; the authority of the authenticating officer
could itself be authenticated, and the genuineness of that signature
checked, and so on. Again each additional step would produce another
degree of confidence, still without achieving complete certainty.
Absolute certainty is no more an attainable goal of auditing than
it is of any other professional endeavor. What is sought is a reasonable
degree of assurance; and what is applied to achieve such reasonable
assurance is and must be a professional judgment as to how far inquiry
should go. The necessity for such a judgment reflects the fact that there
is no ultimate stopping place: each new level of test offers yet another
choice between reliance or still a further test. It reflects the fact that
each incremental step would increase the work involved and therefore
the cost and duration of the audit, without promising ultimate certainty.
The question may be raised whether, even if in ordinary circum
stances audits cannot reasonably be expected to detect all material
fraud, the expectation should not be different when, as in Equity Fund
ing, the fraud is a “massive” one. In other words, it might be suggested
that, assuming the term “massive” could be given a concrete definition,
auditing standards should be such that an auditor’s opinion would in
variably constitute a reasonable assurance that no “massive” fraud
existed such as in Equity Funding. The committee does not believe that
such a suggestion is sound.
On analysis, three fairly distinct meanings might be assigned to the
term “massive” : referring to size— the numerical magnitude of the falsi
fied figures or of the losses incurred by investors and others as a result of
the fraud; referring to the extent of the collusion— the number of per
sons involved in the fraudulent scheme and the elaborateness of that
scheme; and referring to the number of accounts affected. There is, of
course, some connection between these several dimensions of the term,
since it is often the case that the larger dollar amounts of falsifica
tion, the more accounts will be tainted and the more elaborate will be
the precautions necessary to avoid detection of the falsification.
In any of these senses, the more massive a fraud, the greater will be
the likelihood of its detection by customary audit tests. The larger the
number of accounts and records affected by the falsification, the larger
will be the number of potential audit trails leading to its discovery. The
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larger the dollar amount of falsification resulting from the fraud, the
more likely it will be that the fraud will continue and enlarge from year
to year; and the longer the fraud continues, the greater will be the
chances of its coming to light in one way or another. Moreover, the
more extensive the collusion, the more numerous will be the persons
who may intentionally or inadvertently betray their guilty knowledge or
behave in a manner that will arouse suspicion.
On the other hand, the more skillful the collusion, the less likely
will be the discovery of the fraud— regardless of its massiveness in the
sense of size or numbers of accounts affected. Fraudulent devices such
as forgery and the failure to record transactions are virtually impossible
to detect by ordinary auditing, and as to any given auditing procedure,
techniques can be devised that will offer reasonable promise of circum
venting the procedure in question. Thus, there remains the possibility
that even a massive fraud can escape detection by an audit conducted
in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards.
It may fairly be said that the more massive the fraud the more
likely it is to be detected in a conventional audit; nonetheless there is no
definable degree of massiveness as to which such an audit can invariably
be relied upon for such detection. Nor, in the committee’s view, is there
any practicable means of altering auditing standards or procedures so
as to provide such an absolute assurance with respect to any set degree
of massiveness.
In sum, the committee reaffirms the soundness of the accounting
profession’s understanding with respect to the role of audits in the de
tection of fraud. A change in this basic understanding to make the
auditor’s opinion into more of a guarantee of the absence of fraud
would represent a major change in the conception and performance of
audits and would vastly increase their expense— yet still not furnish a
complete guarantee. To ask that a professional opinion be made into
an absolute assurance would, moreover, be to seek a degree of certainty
which is seldom to be found in any other area of commercial life— or,
for that matter, in any area of our lives, private or public. However,
even though such absolute assurance is not feasible, the application of
generally accepted auditing standards will often result in the discovery
of material frauds. Audits also can be expected to deter frauds which
might otherwise occur.
Having said all this, the committee is still concerned that there
may be a divergence in the understanding of the public and of the ac
counting profession with respect to the auditor’s responsibility for de
tection of fraud. Although the committee believes that all of the propo
sitions contained in SAS No. 1, sections 110.05, .06, .07 and .08, are
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sound, it also concludes that the way they are cast, with its greater
emphasis on the limitations rather than on the positive aspects of the
matter, may contribute to the risk of disparity in understanding, between
the public at large and the public accounting profession, as to what an
auditor’s responsibility is with respect to the detection of fraud.
On one hand, there seems to be a tendency to view auditors’ re
ports as if they were warranties— absolute assurances against fraud or
error— and to ignore the practical limitations on auditors’ work, which
SAS No. 1 emphasizes. On the other hand, those limitations, even
though well understood by the profession, may not be expressed in a
persuasive way. The committee believes that a more detailed statement
of both the auditor’s responsibilities and the limitations of those re
sponsibilities might well be helpful in reducing such misunderstanding.
It therefore recommends that the auditing standards executive committee
consider restating those sections of SAS No. 1 which relate to the audi
tor’s responsibility for detection of fraud.
In this respect, it seems clear that the auditor has an obligation to
discover material frauds that are discoverable through application of
customary auditing procedures applied in accordance with generally
accepted auditing standards. The auditing profession should, on an on
going basis, continue to improve the efficiency of customary audit pro
cedures to the end that probability of discovery of material frauds con
tinues to increase within the limits of practicability.

Respectfully Submitted by the
Special Committee on Equity Funding
Marvin L. Stone, Chairman
J. T. Arenberg, Jr.
Leo E. Burger
Robert C. Holsen
A. E. MacKay
AICPA Staff
Thomas R. Hanley

February 1975
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Dissent to Publication at This Time
Messrs. Arenberg and Holsen dissent to the publication of this
Report prior to the termination of significant litigation involving Equity
Funding because (a) the rights of certain litigants may be unfairly
affected by the premature publication of this Report, (b) new informa
tion that may be brought out during the course of the litigation could,
as indicated on page 9 of the Report, affect the committee’s conclu
sions, so that publication would turn out to have been premature, and
(c) the absence of recommendations for changes in auditing procedures
may lead some readers of the Report to believe that the audits were
deficient even though the committee, in keeping with its charge, made
no attempt to assess fault. In addition, they believe that publication
of the Report at this time may establish an unwarranted and potentially
dangerous precedent, particularly when, as in this instance, there has
been no discussion of the Report with the auditors involved.
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Appendix

Appendix
Statement on Auditing Standards No. 1,
Section 110—Paragraphs .05, .06, .07 and .08

Detection of Fraud
.05 In making the ordinary examination, the independent auditor
is aware of the possibility that fraud may exist. Financial statements
may be misstated as the result of defalcations and similar irregularities,
or deliberate misrepresentation by management, or both. The auditor
recognizes that fraud, if sufficiently material, may affect his opinion on
the financial statements, and his examination, made in accordance with
generally accepted auditing standards, gives consideration to this possi
bility. However, the ordinary examination directed to the expression of
an opinion on financial statements is not primarily or specifically de
signed, and cannot be relied upon, to disclose defalcations and other
similar irregularities, although their discovery may result. Similarly, al
though the discovery of deliberate misrepresentation by management is
usually more closely associated with the objective of the ordinary ex
amination, such examination cannot be relied upon to assure its dis
covery. The responsibility of the independent auditor for failure to
detect fraud (which responsibility differs as to clients and others) arises
only when such failure clearly results from failure to comply with gen
erally accepted auditing standards.
.06 Reliance for the prevention and detection of fraud should be
placed principally upon an adequate accounting system with appropriate
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internal control. The well-established practice of the independent audi
tor of evaluating the adequacy and effectiveness of the system of internal
control by testing the accounting records and related data and by relying
on such evaluation for the selection and timing of his other auditing pro
cedures has generally proved sufficient for making an adequate examina
tion. If an objective of an independent auditor’s examination were the
discovery of all fraud, he would have to extend his work to a point where
its cost would be prohibitive. Even then he could not give assurance
that all types of fraud had been detected, or that none existed, because
items such as unrecorded transactions, forgeries, and collusive fraud
would not necessarily be uncovered. Accordingly, it is generally recog
nized that good internal control and fidelity bonds provide protection
more economically and effectively. In the case of fidelity bonds, pro
tection is afforded not only by the indemnification for discovered defal
cations but also by the possible deterrent effect upon employees; the
presence of fidelity bonds, however, should not affect the scope of the
auditor’s examination.
.07 When an independent auditor’s examination leading to an
opinion on financial statements discloses specific circumstances that
make him suspect that fraud may exist, he should decide whether the
fraud, if in fact it should exist, might be of such magnitude as to affect
his opinion on the financial statements. If the independent auditor be
lieves that fraud so material as to affect his opinion may have occurred,
he should reach an understanding with the proper representatives of the
client as to whether the auditor or the client, subject to the auditor’s re
view, is to make the investigation necessary to determine whether fraud
has in fact occurred, and, if so, the amount thereof. If, on the other
hand, the independent auditor concludes that any such fraud could not
be so material as to affect his opinion, he should refer the matter to the
proper representatives of the client with the recommendation that it be
pursued to a conclusion. For example, frauds involving “lapping” ac
counts receivable collections, or frauds involving overstatements of in
ventory, could be material, while those involving peculations from a
small imprest fund would normally be of little significance because the
operation and size of the fund tend to establish a limitation.
.08 The subsequent discovery that fraud existed during the period
covered by the independent auditor’s examination does not of itself indi
cate negligence on his part. He is not an insurer or guarantor; if his
examination was made with due professional skill and care in accordance
with generally accepted auditing standards, he has fulfilled all of the obli
gations implicit in his undertaking.
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